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The Financial Crisis and China’s 
“Harmonious Society” 
Arjan de Haan 
Abstract: The global financial crisis has had a large negative impact on 
China’s economy, particularly on employment, but the government re-
sponses appear to have been effective. This article focuses on the social 
policy responses after the crisis, and how these are situated in the austere 
social policies that have come about since the economic reforms started 
in 1978, and the recent aims to create a “harmonious society” and the 
challenges and contradictions these contain.  
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Introduction 
Few countries outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) were hit harder and sooner by the global finan-
cial crisis than China. While its banks were relatively unaffected, the 
impact has been severe in the areas that were previously the most dy-
namic parts of the global economy. In coastal China, an estimated 20 
million jobs were lost, and tens of thousands of factories closed down 
throughout 2008. But there was public optimism among Chinese com-
mentators and some international commentators about China’s ability to 
“weather the crisis”: The government responded rapidly with a wide 
range of stimulus measures, and the economic downturn did indeed 
bottom out from mid-2009 onwards even though at the time of this 
paper’s finalisation (May 2010), it is unclear how sustainable the recovery 
will be.  
China’s response to the crisis has had and will continue to have an 
enormous global impact, including on the rest of the Global South 
where development has been increasingly determined by China’s eco-
nomic rise. In the medium term, China will look to reduce the global 
financial imbalances along with its domestic stimulus, and to play an 
ever-larger role in international financial institutions. Parallel to this 
changing global role, China’s own development model is likely to be-
come more inward-oriented, which will have an impact on tens of mil-
lions of Chinese that have been involved in – and partly excluded from – 
the most dramatic economic transformation in recent history. 
The focus of this paper is China’s domestic social policy response 
following the crisis, and it emphasises how this is embedded in a balanc-
ing of national and international economic interests. The crisis reinforced 
the urge to build a “harmonious society”, as articulated a few years be-
fore the crisis, now using the stimulus package to do so. The Domestic 
response would imply a shift in the model of economic growth away 
from coastal-based export-promotion towards an inward-oriented 
model, a rearticulation of how links between economic and social poli-
cies are perceived, and the potential of extended and more egalitarian 
social services, accompanied by drastic institutional changes, notably in 
health and social security provisions. This of course is happening within 
the political framework of continued Party control, without signs of the 
political transformations that occurred in East Asia after the 1997-1998 
crisis, and with remaining key development challenges, including regres-
sive fiscal systems and power balances. 
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This paper first briefly discusses China’s integration into the global 
economy, the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and how this has im-
pacted China. It then focuses on the austere social policies that accom-
panied China’s economic reforms, and the emphasis on social services in 
the stimulus package. The final section formulates ideas, based on les-
sons learned from past economic crises, about whether what we are 
witnessing is a turning point in China’s development model, and how the 
crisis affects the political project of a harmonious society.  
Prelude to the Crisis: China’s Integration in the 
World Economy  
China’s growing global economic importance is well known. While still a 
lower-middle-income country with a per capita income under 2,000 USD 
(or 4,000 USD in Purchasing Power Parity, or PPP), it has experienced 
three decades of high levels of economic growth, though not uninter-
rupted. When the cracks in the international financial system started to 
appear, China’s economy had already been overheating, and its govern-
ment had tried to slow down the growth of the economy (Yu 2009; 
Wong 2008; Roache 2007). While the world economy contracted in 
2009, China’s economy grew over eight per cent, partly driven by expan-
sionary fiscal and monetary policy (World Bank 2009a, 2009b). China has 
become one of the world’s largest economies, and definitely the fastest-
growing one, even though tens of millions of people still live in extreme 
poverty.  
Of critical relevance to how we assess the current crisis, China’s de-
velopment path has been directly linked to the world economy’s phase 
of “super-capitalism” (Reich 2008): the expansion of the global economy 
found in China a population that was relatively well-educated and 
healthy, due to the social policies since the revolution. Moreover, the 
country was hungry for restoring its national economy after the eco-
nomic and social disasters of the 1950s and 1960s. While agriculture and, 
later, rural industrialisation drove the restoration of China’s economy in 
the 1970s and 1980s, exports have been a main driver of recent eco-
nomic growth. We have now become accustomed to the image of China 
as global manufacturing house, but this is a very recent phenomenon. 
Export-promotion was part of China’s policy during the 1980s, but ex-
ports and foreign direct investment (FDI) took off only in the 1990s, 
following an economic downturn, the civil unrest of the late 1980s (Zhao 
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Zhiyang’s memoirs published in 2009 provide fascinating insight into 
internal political differences at the time), and Deng’s Southern Tour in 
1992. This was followed by the 1997-1998 East Asia crisis – in which 
China was not affected as much as it was in 2008 (Jia 2009) – which 
strengthened the urge to build up foreign reserves. 
Before the 2008 crisis, exports formed about 40 per cent of GDP, 
with those to the US forming about one-third of the total (Seibert 2007; 
Yang 2008; Prasad 2009). While exports have been mainly low technol-
ogy, the share of high technology is growing rapidly. Foreign invest-
ments in China have played an important role for its exports, and over 
time, policy moved from joint ventures towards allowing wholly foreign-
owned companies. China developed an export bundle resembling that of 
a country that is four times as rich. While capital flows and exchange 
rates continue to be controlled, China built up large surpluses in current, 
capital and financial accounts, and accumulated huge international re-
serves (estimated at over two trillion USD), which, with the financial 
crisis, have become a major concern and point of debate. China has also 
become an important investor abroad, by both private and state Chinese 
companies, and it is playing an increasingly important role in the devel-
opment path of Africa.  
Thus, China’s international economic interests follow directly from 
its domestic reform strategy. These processes are managed by a strong 
Party state that carefully balances global and domestic interests. China’s 
integration into the world economy rapidly intensified during the 1990s, 
and this directly defined the way it was affected by the global crisis, to 
which we turn next.    
The Global Financial Crisis and Its Impact on 
China  
The global economic crisis exposed the vulnerability of China’s 
growth pattern in a dramatic fashion (Yu 2009: 8). 
The causes, manifestations and impacts of the global financial crisis that 
erupted in 2008 have been well documented. The crisis started in the US 
but very rapidly impacted the rest of world, including emerging market 
economies. Cracks in the system had appeared in August 2007, and with 
Lehman Brothers’ September 2008 default, a full-blown global financial 
crisis ensued. Stock market wealth may have declined by approximately 
50 per cent. Global GDP declined by two per cent in 2009. According to 
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Krugman (2009: 165-166), rather than the crisis being nothing that had 
been seen before, it was “like everything we’ve seen before”, a combina-
tion of the bursting of the real estate bubble, a wave of bank runs, liquid-
ity traps, and crises in international capital flows and currencies. By Au-
gust 2009 signs of recovery started to appear, and the world’s economy is 
expected to grow again by two per cent in 2010, though particularly 
Europe continues to be marked by uncertainty.  
Governments’ responses to the economic crisis have been forceful, 
and apparently very different from their responses to the crisis of the 
1930s and to the 1997-1998 crisis. The focus has been to restore global 
financial stability, through large-scale government interventions across 
the world, and a range of micro-level measures has been introduced in 
response to increasing unemployment, and, for example, to promote 
housing markets, in the medium term rapidly increasing public debt.  
The impacts have been highly heterogeneous, across countries, and 
within countries. The crisis is expected to have a negative impact in de-
veloping countries, where people have fewer resources to cope with the 
crisis, social policies are too weak to respond adequately, and economic 
policy instruments are limited. Emerging economies where the stock 
markets were directly affected by the crisis, and where the crisis was 
followed by devaluation of the currency (e.g. Brazil and India), appear to 
be weathering the crisis well, and macroeconomic fundamentals continue 
to be strong (Naudé 2009). Impacts on trade and investment are of 
course very different across the globe, including because of the drastic 
changes in prices accompanying the crisis and following the preceding 
price spikes in primary commodities. World exports (in US-Dollar val-
ues) contracted by 24 per cent in 2009, and are expected to grow again 
by 11 per cent in 2010. For South and East Asia the decline was 17 per 
cent, and the expected 2010 growth 11 per cent (UNDESA 2010). 
Global FDI may have declined by about 15 per cent in 2008, as the fi-
nancial crisis was transmitted through tighter credit, lower corporate 
profits, and eroded business confidence. FDI in developing countries 
was still expected to see a growth of seven per cent, with the expectation 
for Asia at six per cent (Filippov and Kalotay 2009). In China, in the first 
seven months of 2009 FDI saw a decline of 20 per cent compared to the 
same period in 2008 (IIF 2010), while an increase was again noticed in 
the second half of 2009.  
In stark contrast to OECD countries’ economic growth, but com-
parable to India, China’s economic growth remained high: 6.1 and 7.9 
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per cent in the first two quarters of 2009, respectively. China maintained 
its eight per cent growth target, and as 2009 went by it became increas-
ingly likely it would achieve this. The limited openness of the financial 
sector has helped to reduce the direct impact of the global financial crisis 
on China’s banking sector, though Fan Mingtai (2008) warns that faulty 
information may be distorting the picture. However, the crisis did soon 
impact the real economy, through shrinking exports and through the 
stock market. 
The economic crisis has had a visible impact on employment in 
China, though official figures are not available (see Duckett and Hussain 
2008). Large numbers of unskilled workers lost their jobs, but estimates 
of unemployment are far from clear. The Financial Times reported that 
67,000 factories closed during the first half of 2008, and local newspa-
pers suggested 6.7 million jobs disappeared in Guangdong alone. Most 
of the unskilled, newly unemployed workers were migrants, who – as 
was widely reported – were expected to return to their areas of origin. 
According to estimates generated by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
informed by research using focus group discussions that suggested 10-15 
per cent of migrants were not returning after the holidays, 20 million 
people became unemployed.  
China closely monitored the return of migrants because of the fear 
of social unrest. Over time, the fears of unrest seemed to have disap-
peared somewhat. However, the China Study Group reported that the 
numbers of so-called “mass incidents” was higher in 2009 than ever 
before, and that workers’ protests are becoming more autonomous 
(China Study Group 2009). Premier Wen emphasized that “even greater 
complexity in the domestic and international situation”, and the security 
chief thought maintaining social stability “was still extremely onerous” 
(The Economist 2010). Arguably the ethnic tension and violence at the 
Guangdong toy factory, which was followed by the violence in Xinjiang, 
was related to job losses. 
Adding up all categories of new job seekers – unemployed migrants, 
job-searching college graduates, laid-off workers and others, along with 
the officially registered unemployed and new market entrants – Schucher 
(2009) estimates a number of 42 million, with about 15 million jobs cre-
ated. Graduate unemployment has been rising for some time. Officially, 
urban unemployment was four per cent in mid-2008, and only very 
slowly rising, but reports have clearly indicated that the number of new 
jobs created is not sufficient to match the number of new graduates. In 
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mid-2009 some observers argued that the government was less con-
cerned with unemployment in rural areas than that of educated, urban 
workers. 
Observations suggested that young migrants often did not return to 
their villages, and that many returned early from the New Year’s holidays 
in search of jobs, again closely monitored by officials and police (Brad-
sher 2009). In September 2009 the labour minister suggested numbers of 
jobs for migrants would be five per cent below that of a year earlier, and 
that excess supply of labour would continue for “a long period of time” 
(Reuters 2009). National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) figures published mid-
September 2009 suggested that at the end of June 2009, 4.2 million rural 
migrant workers were still unemployed outside of their hometowns 
(China Daily 2009d). Moreover, China Labor Watch reported a distinctive 
trend of worsening labour conditions as a result of the crisis (Li Qiang 
2009). While recent years have seen improvement in protection of la-
bour, after the crisis, measures were taken to reduce statutory labour 
costs, arguing this would be required to maintain jobs (Global Action 
2009). In January the ministries of Human Resources and Social Security 
issued a joint statement urging employers to avoid or reduce mass layoffs 
by reducing wage costs, placing workers on leave or creating “flexible 
working arrangements”. In February the State Council advised local 
governments to cut employment costs temporarily by reducing or sus-
pending social security premiums.  
Despite heavy blows to the export industry, China in 2008 had the 
fiscal and macroeconomic space to implement a substantial stimulus (see 
de Haan forthcoming a for more detail). A range of economic measures 
were introduced: reduction in taxes, changes in value-added tax rebates 
to promote exports (previously used to slow down the economy), a loos-
ening of credit (according to some, possibly leading to a bubble, and 
followed by reductions in lending mid-2009), measures to stabilise hous-
ing and stock markets, and subsidies for the purchase of consumption 
goods. Finally, the value of the CNY has been subject to much discus-
sion: Even though the currency had appreciated over the preceding  
couple of years, its current value is still thought to be relatively low, thus 
promoting China’s exports. 
While some Chinese officials in the first half of 2009 shared con-
cerns that we had witnessed the end of China’s export-led growth, the 
measures taken indicate that China was simultaneously promoting do-
mestic consumption, while trying to gain from the recovery of global 
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demand. The Keynesian stimulus package will be discussed further be-
low, but we first turn to the social policy model that has accompanied 
China’s economic success since 1978. 
China’s Social Policy since 1978: From  
Productivism …  
To assess China’s economic responses to the crisis, including the fiscal 
stimulus, we must first analyse its social policies under its growth- and 
increasingly export-led model since the reforms started. Social policy is 
defined here as the broad set of public interventions and institutions that 
intentionally enhances well-being, and is complementary (rather than 
residual) to economic policy (Mkandawire 2004; UNRISD 2006; de 
Haan 2007 and forthcoming b; de Haan and Sabharwal 2008). Social 
policy changes in China since the 1970s have been driven by two sets of 
dramatic changes, which both contribute to the emergence of new vul-
nerabilities alongside rapid poverty reduction, and to high rates of private 
savings due to the absence of adequate protection against health and 
other risks.  
First, the radical and continuing demographic shift from rural to ur-
ban areas is shaping the social policies accompanying China’s economic 
strategy. In the 1980s and 1990s public policies came to focus on en-
abling a move out of agriculture, but current health and social security 
reforms also have strong rural components, alongside targeted anti-
poverty programmes. Increasingly, following the demographic dividend 
of a rapidly declining birthrate, the ageing of the population is playing a 
role, leading to concerns regarding pension reform.  
Second, the economic reforms have, of course, implied a radical and 
very conscious privatisation of the economy, and collapse of the social 
services previously provided through communes and state-owned enter-
prises. Dramatic rises in incomes have been accompanied by a virtual 
collapse of public provisions, education, health and social security, par-
ticularly in rural areas where land rights remain central to social security. 
Alongside rapidly rising inequalities in income and human development, 
the population probably experienced substantial “churning” in poverty 
status (moving in and out of poverty) as healthcare costs became pro-
hibitively high for many, and household savings have risen to extremely 
high levels. Table 1 shows changes in GDP components and household 
consumption. Household savings rates have been around 25 per cent, 
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rising through the 1980s till the late 1990s (Horioka and Wan 2007), and 
appear to have risen again since 2005 (Seeking Alpha 2009). Social se-
curity coverage in the new – including export-oriented – enterprises has 
remained low, uneven and insufficiently regulated. 
Table 1: Components of GDP Growth and Household Consumption since 
1978  
 Components of GDP Growth Household 
Consumption 
Expenditure 
Urban-rural 
Consump-
tion Ratio 
  
Final Con-
sumption 
Expendi-
ture 
Gross 
Capital 
Forma-
tion 
Net 
Exports 
Index 
1978=100 
  
1978 39.4 66.0 -5.4 100 2.9 
1980 71.8 26.5 1.8 117 2.7 
1982 64.7 23.8 11.5 135 2.4 
1984 69.3 40.5 -9.8 163 2.2 
1986 45.0 23.2 31.8 194 2.3 
1988 49.6 39.4 11.0 222 2.6 
1990 47.8 1.8 50.4 229 2.9 
1992 72.5 34.2 -6.8 282 3.3 
1994 30.2 43.8 26.0 320 3.7 
1996 60.1 34.3 5.6 378 3.4 
1998 57.1 26.4 16.5 418 3.5 
2000 65.1 22.4 12.5 491 3.7 
2002 43.6 48.8 7.6 553 3.6 
2004 38.7 55.3 6.0 632 3.8 
2006 38.7 42.0 19.3 748 3.6 
2007 39.4 40.9 19.7 824 3.6 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2008. 
Despite the country’s uniqueness, the nature of China’s social policy can 
be described in the East Asian social policy analysis tradition, and it is in 
line with East Asian governments’ antagonism to Western-style welfare 
interventions and the dependencies these would create (Holliday 2000; 
Kwon 2005; London 2009; Tang and Midgley 2010). Countries in the 
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region, often under authoritarian regimes, introduced (state-led) welfare 
policies at a lower level of development than OECD countries, with 
China of course showing a “U-curve” rather than linear path following 
the collapse of the pre-1978 model. In China as elsewhere in East Asia, 
social policies have played a key role in nation-building processes, and in 
the case of China, social policies have also played a large part in the pol-
itical project of maintaining the Party’s position. Egalitarian norms pre-
dominate in the public debate, often under authoritarian practices and 
with a focus on productive opportunities. The state continues to be seen 
as the guardian of public welfare, while at the same time policies are 
based on Confucian perceptions of the family as the main provider of 
welfare. 
Table 2: Government Spending as Proportion of GDP  
 Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
 National 
Govern-
ment 
Revenue 
Govt. 
Reve-
nue 
National 
Govern-
ment Ex-
penditure 
Ratio 
Local 
Govern-
ment 
 100 mil-
lion CNY 
CNY 100 mil-
lion CNY 
% of 
GDP 
100 million 
CNY 
% Govt 
Exp. 
1978 3,645.2 381 1,132 31 1,122 52.6 
1980 4,545.6 463 1,160 26 1,229 45.7 
1985 9,016.0 858 2,005 22 2,004 60.3 
1990 18,667.8 1,644 2,937 16 3,084 67.4 
1992 26,923.5 2,311 3,483 13 3,742 68.7 
1994 48,197.9 4,044 5,218 11 5,793 69.7 
1996 71,176.6 5,846 7,408 10 7,938 72.9 
1998 84,402.3 6,796 9,876 12 10,798 71.1 
2000 99,214.6 7,858 13,395 14 15,887 65.3 
2002 120,332.7 9,398 18,904 16 22,053 69.3 
2004 159,878.3 12,336 26,396 17 28,487 72.3 
2006 211,923.5 16,165 38,760 18 40,423 75.3 
2007 249,529.9 18,934 51,322 21 49,781 77.0 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2008. 
Social policies in the region are marked by a “productivist” orientation 
(Holliday 2000), which emphasises a congruence of social objectives with 
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economic ones. Public spending, including in sectoral allocations to so-
cial sectors (to some extent seen as “non-productive”, but see also 
Zhang 2008), is tightly controlled. We should look at this in the broader 
context of public revenues and spending. As has been widely docu-
mented, government revenue as percentage of GDP declined rapidly 
between 1978 and the mid-1990s. The 1994 fiscal reforms employed a 
policy of “tax-sharing”, which reduced the role of provinces in revenue 
collection and increased the role of provinces in revenue expenditure, 
without clearly defining relationships with the lowest levels of govern-
ment (Chan, Ngok, and Phillips 2008: 55). However, government reve-
nue has picked up remarkably, doubling between 1996 and 2007. Table 2 
gives an overview of government spending. While China’s ratio of public 
spending to GDP is thought to be low by international comparison, such 
comparisons are difficult. Inclusion of extra-budgetary revenues would 
lift fiscal revenue above that of many OECD countries (Song 2009), and 
may have reached 32 per cent of GDP (Lu and Feng 2008: 75). 
The federal nature of public spending is critical in this picture: 
Three-quarters of total public spending in 2007 was by local govern-
ments; put simply, the flipside of the local “autonomy” of policy reforms 
and piloting (“one country, multiple systems”) is the need for sub-
national government to ensure that funding is available. The model of 
public finance has made funding regressive, with the poorest areas strug-
gling the most to fund projects (Zhang and Fan 2007; Wong 2009; see 
Table 4). The divisions established after 1949 still contribute heavily to a 
significant urban bias, and until recently the countryside remained heavily 
taxed, and local fiscal spending remains biased towards urban areas. So-
cial spending, particularly in rural areas, is adversely affected by the 
model of public finance: Not only are total allocations to social sectors 
low, but a particularly large part of social spending is by sub-national 
governments (see Table 3; Shen and Zou 2006; Tao, Yang and Liu 2009).  
Social policies have been pro-active (but selective), and they have 
been designed to play a key role in China’s pattern of economic growth 
and entry to global markets. Generally, provisions are strictly targeted, 
with tight eligibility criteria, and supported by a very low poverty line, 
which has recently been increased but remains low by international stan-
dards. Public policies around, for example, capacity-building, and em-
phasis on adjustment of the public sector and the need for cost-recovery 
emphasise the productivity of public investments, reducing the potential 
for an effective safety net for the most vulnerable.  
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Table 3: National Government Expenditure by Area and Distribution, Local 
and National 
  
National 
Gov-
ernment 
Expen-
diture 
Items as 
% of 
Total 
Expen-
diture 
Central 
Govern-
ment 
Spending 
Local 
Gov-
ernment 
Spend-
ing 
Local 
Govt. as 
% of 
Overall 
Spend-
ing 
Total 49,781.35  11,442.06 38,339.29 77 
General Public 
Services 8,514.24 17.1 2,160.17 6,354.07 75 
Foreign Affairs 215.28 0.4 213.78 1.50 1 
National Defense 3,554.91 7.1 3,482.32 72.59 2 
Public Security 3,486.16 7.0 607.83 2,878.33 83 
Education 7,122.32 14.3 395.26 6,727.06 94 
Science and Tech-
nology 1,783.04 3.6 924.60 858.44 48 
Culture, Sport and 
Media 898.64 1.8 127.21 771.43 86 
Social Safety Net 
and Employment 5,447.16 10.9 342.63 5,104.53 94 
Medical and Health 
Care 1,989.96 4.0 34.21 1,955.75 98 
Environment Pro-
tection 995.82 2.0 34.59 961.23 97 
Urban and Rural 
Community Affairs 3,244.69 6.5 6.20 3,238.49 100 
Agriculture, For-
estry, Water  3,404.70 6.8 313.70 3,091.00 91 
Transportation 1,915.38 3.8 782.25 1,133.13 59 
Industry, Com-
merce and Banking 4,257.49 8.6 1,442.45 2,815.04 66 
Other Expenditure 2,951.56 5.9 574.86 2,376.70 81 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2008. 
Table 4: Government Expenditure by Region 
 Gross Regional 
Product 
Government Expenditure by Region 
Region 100 million CNY 
2007 
10,000 CNY % Regional 
Product 
Beijing 9,353.32 1,6495,023 18 
Tianjin 5,050.40 6,743,262 13 
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 Gross Regional 
Product 
Government Expenditure by Region 
Region 100 million CNY 
2007 
10,000 CNY % Regional  
Product 
Hebei 13,709.50 15,066,482 11 
Shanxi 5,733.35 10,499,228 18 
Inner Mongolia 6,091.12 10,823,054 18 
Liaoning 11,023.49 17,642,805 16 
Jilin 5,284.69 8,837,597 17 
Heilongjiang 7,065.00 11,872,711 17 
Shanghai 12,188.85 21,816,780 18 
Jiangsu 25,741.15 25,537,217 10 
Zhejiang 18,780.44 18,067,928 10 
Anhui 7,364.18 12,438,342 17 
Fujian 9,249.13 9,106,446 10 
Jiangxi 5,500.25 9,050,582 16 
Shandong 25,965.91 22,618,495 9 
Henan 15,012.46 18,706,135 12 
Hubei 9,230.68 12,773,257 14 
Hunan 9,200.00 13,570,310 15 
Guangdong 31,084.40 31,595,703 10 
Guangxi 5,955.65 9,859,433 17 
Hainan 1,223.28 2,451,967 20 
Chongqing 4,122.51 7,683,886 19 
Sichuan 10,505.30 17,591,304 17 
Guizhou 2,741.90 7,953,990 29 
Yunnan 4,741.31 11,352,175 24 
Tibet 342.19 2,753,682 80 
Shaanxi 5,465.79 10,539,665 19 
Gansu 2,702.40 6,753,372 25 
Qinghai 783.61 2,821,993 36 
Ningxia 889.20 2,418,545 27 
Xinjiang 3,523.16 7,951,540 23 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 2008. 
  82 Arjan de Haan 
 
Alongside a conscious congruence with its economic strategy, social 
policies have evolved in tandem with China’s very rapid institutional 
changes. These include drastic reconfigurations of public and private 
spheres following the opening up of markets and the dismantling of 
state-owned enterprises, and of power balances (and related ideologies) 
between ministries such as those of Health and Civil Affairs in the re-
form of health services. The gradual reframing of rights for migrants 
workers breaking through the dualism of the hukou system created during 
the pre-reform decades will also have enormous implications for the 
well-being of large numbers of citizens. The transformation of public 
institutions into more accountable and equitable organisations has be-
come a key feature of the policies for a “harmonious society”, as de-
scribed in the next section. 
… to a “Harmonious Society”? 
While the 1980s focused on privatisation and economic growth, expli-
citly accepting the rapidly rising inequalities, during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s the forces for strengthening government in public services 
started to grow, following the withdrawal of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) from social provisions, and resulting in initial and very careful 
and/ or gradual reforms in education, health and social security (Chan, 
Ngok, and Phillips 2008; Lu and Feng 2008). Examples of early reforms 
include the urban di bao, the social assistance “Minimum Living Standard 
Scheme”, which was piloted in Shanghai in the early 1990s (see Davies et 
al. 2009 for analysis and critique of Shanghai’s reforms), and extended 
rapidly since the late 1990s. A voluntary pension system was introduced 
in 1986, and pilot schemes initiated during the early 1990s, but the ex-
periments collapsed during the 1990s. In 1986 the Leading Group for 
Poverty Reduction was set up, with an annual budget of about ten billion 
CNY, and 15 per cent of the country’s counties were designated as 
“poor counties”. More recently, various measures have been taken to 
promote the rural economy and a “new socialist countryside”, promoted 
for example at the October 2008 Plenary Session of the Communist 
Party’s Central Committee (Wu 2008). Ahlers and Schubert (2009) judge 
the “new socialist countryside” project to be more than just a political 
slogan. 
Policy initiatives during the 1990s also started to rebuild the educa-
tion and health provisions that had faltered since the late 1970s. Primary 
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education was made free of charge, and allocations to education have 
risen consistently over the last decade. In the early 1990s the government 
emphasised the need for improvement in health indicators, and in the 
late 1990s it started to experiment with approaches towards health sys-
tem changes, with the objective of enhancing access. With healthcare to 
a large extent privatised in the immediate post-reform period, in the 
1990s discussions started to focus on the forms that social provisions 
had to take, notably of national healthcare versus a social insurance sys-
tem – in the end producing a mixed system, though with insurance at its 
core. The medical health insurance New Cooperative Medical Scheme 
(NCMS) is now in operation nationally, with all counties developing their 
own decentralized system of implementation. This aims to reduce rural-
urban differences, with central government commitment to increase 
public health spending particularly in poor areas. The post-2008 stimulus 
package as we discuss below included a significantly increased outlay for 
the health sector.  
While the foundations of China’s political system may have re-
mained unchanged, with institutional change described as “trapped tran-
sition” by Pei Minxin (2006), policy-makers are responding to political 
and popular pressure, with significant implications for and transforma-
tion of models of policy implementation at local levels. Since the mid-
1990s, social policies have played an important role in this response, but 
the urgency with which the Chinese government is now effecting these 
policies increased greatly with the change in top leadership in 2002, the 
SARS crisis in 2003, and since 2004, when concerns about social in-
equalities became a hot topic on the political agenda, thus foreshadowing 
the political project for a “harmonious society”. During the 1990s, after 
Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour, economic reform-minded ideas had 
maintained the upper hand. But concerns about social inequalities grew 
too, and by the end of the 1980s, academics and researchers were point-
ing at a “justice gap” in the reform policies. These voices had gained 
strength by 2004, no doubt influenced by the intensifying and changing 
nature of protests since the late 1990s (Kelly 2006: 9; Wong 2009: 950), 
and by the need felt by the Chinese leadership to reach out to the com-
mon people (Yu 2007). 
In February 2005 at the Party School, Hu Jintao announced that the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the central government had made 
it an important task to build a harmonious society, as “China is facing 
thorny domestic issues, as well as complicated and volatile international 
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situations” (People’s Daily 2005). The doctrine of harmonious society 
(hexie shehui) highlights the  
importance, guidelines, goals and principles of building a socialist 
harmonious society; coordinating development, social equity and jus-
tice; cultural harmony and consolidating the ideological foundations 
for social harmony; and improving public administration to build a 
society of vigor and order (Kelly 2006; see also Zheng and Tok 2007; 
Geis and Holt 2009).  
It was passed by the CCP in October 2006, and became a basic devel-
opment goal in the Eleventh Five Year Plan. The harmonious society 
project is generally seen as the way the Hu Jintao/ Wen Jiabao admini-
stration distinguishes itself from its predecessors, and as a response to 
the unacceptable social costs and political risks of the reforms imple-
mented since the late 1970s. Both Deng Xiaoping (“efficiency comes 
first, with proper attention paid to equity”), and Jiang Zemin had empha-
sised market reforms, the “socialist market economy”, and a xiaokang 
(moderately well-off) society. But under pressure from the Left and the 
large numbers of cases of social unrest, “social justice” had come to the 
centre of political attention – even though interpretations and implica-
tions for policy continue to be debated, with the crisis providing impetus 
for further articulation, as we describe below. 
By 2008, arguably, Chinese policies were moving towards universal 
social policies (White Paper 2004). This took place in the context of the 
enormous policy challenges of China’s great transformation, and was 
shaped by institutions and power constellations, notably the urban-rural 
dualism, and the regional inequalities that were fuelled by fiscal transfers. 
The policy shifts articulated strong notions of equity, or at least an idea 
of state responsibility for providing opportunities for the entire popula-
tion. Though the shifts were obviously a response to fears of social un-
rest, they were simultaneously an effort to address corruption within the 
public sector, and promoted improvements in access without necessarily 
providing significant additional funding. Fiscal prudence and an ideology 
of economic contribution rather than welfarism have continued to 
dominate the thinking about social policy. This set the scene for the 
immediate response to the crisis in 2008.  
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China’s Stimulus Package 
Soon after the global crisis unfolded, and having felt the impact on 
skilled and un-skilled workers even before, China introduced a large 
stimulus package of four trillion CNY (586 billion USD) over two years, 
by some calculations 12-14 per cent of 2008 GDP (or 6-7 per cent on an 
annual basis). There were doubts about how much of that money was 
new money, rather than public funding that had been committed earlier 
(including for reconstruction after the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake). 
The package was not entirely a financial injection from the central gov-
ernment, as central funding is matched – as is the practice in fiscally 
decentralized China, as described above – by contributions from (semi-) 
private sources and lower-level government, and to a large extent by 
bank lendings. Out of the four trillion CNY package, one quarter is in 
the form of direct grants and interest rate subsidies. Bank credits are the 
second-largest source, while local governments proposed their own 
package of 18 trillion CNY (Yu 2009: 10). Given the decline in value of 
assets associated with the global crisis, an injection of six to seven per 
cent of GDP may in itself not be sufficiently large to stabilise the econ-
omy. However, an immediate impact was felt (Roberts 2009, for exam-
ple), though some observers believe a slowing down of the economy 
may follow when the impact of the stimulus would come to an end (the 
so-called W-shape of crisis and recovery), and concerns have been articu-
lated about a possible financial bubble created by new bank lending. 
The breakdown of the package is shown in Table 5. The stimulus 
package’s emphasis has been on investment. This is understandable 
given the need to insert money into the economy quickly. Investing in 
infrastructure has been one of the strengths of China’s economic model, 
and was reinforced by the central government’s “frenzied response” to 
raise funds for infrastructural spending (Wong 2009: 951). But this em-
phasis also came under criticism. China’s growth model has already been 
skewed heavily towards investment, while households are saving about 
one quarter of their disposable income, and private consumption is only 
about one third of the GDP. The positive economic impact of investing 
in infrastructure is likely to be only temporary, as this would promote 
supply and not demand. In the past, according to Yang Du (2008), 
physical investments have proven to have insignificant effects on in-
creasing employment. While investment growth in the first half of 2009 
was over 30 per cent, increases in sales of (industrial) goods were negli-
gible. And some have argued that investments surged into high-polluting 
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and energy-intensive projects, and would lead to falling investment effi-
ciency (Zhang and Xi 2009; Yu 2009).  
Table 5: China’s Stimulus Package 
 CNY (in billions) % of Total Package 
Public infrastructure  1,500 38 
Earthquake reconstruction 1,000 25 
Social welfare 400 10 
Rural development 370 9 
Technology advancement 370 9 
Sustainable development 210 5 
Educational and cultural program-
mes 150 4 
Total 4,000  
Source: Economic Observer 2009. 
At the same time, the government promised more than just “more of the 
same” in infrastructure. The economic stimulus package that was intro-
duced was seen not only as a temporary Keynesian-type effort to miti-
gate the downfall, but also a restructuring of its economic model, par-
ticularly to promote domestic (private) consumption. Reinforcing the 
belief in China’s continued economic growth, and continuing to show 
leadership during the crisis, Hu Jintao stressed: “Crisis creates opportuni-
ties, and we shall put more efforts in technological upgrading, and build 
up technology reserves for the future” (China Daily 2009c).  
The stimulus package, alongside its emphasis on infrastructure and 
hardware, also contained much promise for social sectors, and for pro-
fessor Zhao Xijun of Renmin University, for example, the  
decision to spend more on public sectors such as healthcare comes at 
a crucial moment as the country strides to expand domestic markets 
to offset negative impacts from global economic downturn (Xinhua 
2009). 
But for many commentators, the proposed investment in social sectors 
has been too little.  
The rush of local infrastructural […] projects [following the fiscal 
stimulus] stands in marked contrast to the wait-and-see posture of 
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many local governments to the recent social spending programmes 
(Wong 2009: 951).  
Tang Min argued that funding for social welfare needs to go up to 35 per 
cent of government revenue (China Daily 2009a). Guan Xinping sug-
gested the government needs to invest more to educate and train youth 
and the unemployed, speed up the establishment of basic social security 
system, and strengthen public services (China Daily 2009b). Ding Yuan-
zhu of CASS argued for creating of effective social demand as a per-
manent cure for crisis (China Daily 2009b). Some expressed fears that the 
investment in hardware might even reduce access to healthcare facilities, 
for example, because of institutions’ incentives to recover costs. It is 
unlikely that the fiscal stimulus will lead to a rapid decrease in personal 
saving rates (indeed the growth in 2009 seems mainly driven by increased 
investment).  
It seemed the government over time responded to criticism by in-
creasing or highlighting its commitments to social spending. Education, 
particularly vocational training and education of migrant workers, was 
emphasised during the China Development High Level Forum in March 
2009. Along those lines, Premier Wen’s Report on the Work of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress of 9 March 2009, proposed 
strengthening the rural social safety net and promoted employment and 
reemployment (Zhang 2009). 
In January 2009 the government announced spending of 124 billion 
USD in three years (0.8 per cent of GDP) to promote nationwide 
healthcare, and this will arguably be the centrepiece of China’s social 
policy reforms over the coming years. The current investment – seen by 
some as a down payment for the longer-term reforms – follows years of 
debate and policy development, and the current crisis in a way provides 
both the need and the opportunity to use economic means to address 
social issues, through the relatively well-tested structure of governance. 
The healthcare reform followed the recognition of ballooning private 
households’ healthcare spending, and the recognition that healthcare 
could not be considered a commercial product. The reform’s main ob-
jective is universal coverage of basic healthcare through improvements in 
the public health system, medical care delivery system, the health 
insurance scheme (NCMS) mentioned earlier, and the pharmaceutical 
system. By 2020, the central government is expected to fully subsidize 
the “essential public health package”. Government officials expect much 
from the expansion of the health insurance scheme as a mode of organ-
  88 Arjan de Haan 
 
ising access to healthcare, with coverage already exceeding 90 per cent, 
while making available additional funding for investment in public facili-
ties.  
The direction of China’s post-crisis social policy is thus not funda-
mentally different than it has been so far. Some of the labour regulations 
– very slowly having been expanded over the preceding years – in fact 
have been reversing direction, at least temporarily. There is much conti-
nuity, driven by – apart from the fiscal reserves that enable the stimulus 
– a dominant public policy perception of the close link between eco-
nomic policies and the “harmonious society”, and its tradition of learn-
ing-based and pragmatic reform. The eight per cent economic growth 
target continues to be central to social and economic objectives, social 
spending is rising but continues to be low, and weak social and unem-
ployment insurance can only be reformed in the medium term. The ex-
pansion of services and gradual universalising of healthcare and primary 
education was initiated before the crisis, and the investment in health 
services post-crisis are made possible by the previous cautious health 
reforms, which have set in place the infrastructure that now allows ab-
sorption of increased funding. How then, can we conceptualise the im-
pact of the crisis?  
Crisis as a Turning Point? 
The lessons the world has learned from the responses to past crises sug-
gest ways to conceptualise the ongoing transformation. 1  Current US 
policy responses are informed by the lessons learnt from the Great De-
pression. East Asia has drawn conclusions from the 1997-1998 crisis, 
and in South Korea there is now a feeling the country is much better 
prepared than before (Kwon 2009). After 1997 Chinese policy-makers 
concluded that China needed to enhance its fiscal position while avoid-
ing the continued recession Japan fell into. China’s response also shows 
that it is keen to study the experiences of other countries and learn from 
them. This section explores whether past lessons can help to interpret 
ongoing events, and whether the current crisis may be a turning point in 
China’s development model. 
                                                 
1 This section is based on a workshop DFID Beijing organised on request of the 
State Council’s Development Research Centre, Beijing, February 2009. See Gong 
2009. 
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The international development literature emphasises that crisis re-
sponse plans need to be in place before the crisis hits, because time and 
administrative capacities tend to be limited, and because natural crises 
often accompany economic ones (such as droughts during both the 
Great Depression and the Asian Financial Crisis). However, experience 
from the US during the 1930s illustrates the large number of initiatives 
and agencies that were established, on an ad hoc basis, and only few 
were successful, but the legacy of the responses has been very long 
(Mitchener 2009).  
China’s 2008-2009 response is consistent with its evidence-based 
policy model of “seeking truth from facts” that has marked the reforms 
since 1978 (Zhang, de Haan and Fan forthcoming). The Chinese gov-
ernment’s response, as mentioned, is to a great extent driven by fears of 
social unrest. The government system is also keen and able to quickly 
evaluate the impact of policies, such as that of the expansionary credit 
policies of 2009 that led to inflation particularly in the housing sector. 
The government also responded to a perceived neglect of social sectors 
in the stimulus package. At the same time, as we saw in the last section, 
there is much continuity in China’s emphasis on infrastructure invest-
ment. China has gradually expanded its social security systems over the 
last few years, thus providing opportunities for relatively accountable, 
enhanced public spending, but the extension will remain gradual, partly 
because of vested interests in infrastructure financing, and partly because 
of administrative, political and ideological concerns; thus in the eyes of 
some observers who had expected or hoped for a more drastic change, 
this implied an “opportunity lost” (Cook 2009).  
Evidence from previous major downturns suggests crises are not 
merely cyclical phenomena. The US knows it cannot return to its previ-
ous high levels of credit-driven consumption, and global financial institu-
tions will be adapting to a new reality. Lessons from earlier crises suggest 
they provide windows of opportunities and political commitment for 
change. The New Deal meant a radical transformation, not only in terms 
of an increase of government as a share of GNP, but by 1935, a radical 
transformation was also made in the relationship between the federal, 
state and local governments, the result of which was improved coordina-
tion and public finance (Mitchener 2009). After 1997-1998, Thailand’s 
government put in place a wide range of supportive measures, including 
expansion of healthcare and pensions for the poor, involving and mobi-
lising civil society and the private sector (Teokul 2009). In Indonesia, the 
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economic crisis was followed by social mobilisation contributing to de-
mocratisation, while decentralisation and local decision-making was 
strengthened (Murniningtyas 2009).  
Measures put in place during crises have long-term implications, 
even though the fiscal response of the New Deal did not manage to pull 
the economy out of the crisis. FDR’s 1935 statement “I place the secur-
ity of men, women, and children of the nation first” is a symbol of radi-
cally altered public responsibility and policies, and indeed the country’s 
social contract. As narrated by Mitchener (2009) the impact of measures 
put in place in the 1930s are felt even today, through regulation in bank-
ing, labour and farming. The New Deal radically transformed the US 
economy and US society, not only in terms of government spending but 
also in terms of perceptions of state responsibility, and relations between 
central and local governments. The East Asia crises in 1997-1998 have 
led to a range of initiatives around monitoring impacts of economic 
changes, and new policies of social protection, many of which appear to 
be there to stay; the new social protection agenda even had a big impact 
on the global development debate. 
In the case of China we can also see such turning points, though the 
crisis seems to be accelerating these rather than initiating them. The 
global financial system is of considerable concern to China, and its strat-
egy is unlikely to be the same as in the past. The realisation of the end of 
an era was evident in the earlier efforts China made to slow down the 
export economy. In some of the responses, it seemed as if economic 
policy-makers were already prepared for such a reversal, having studied 
lessons from other parts of East Asia, including about previous eco-
nomic crises and downturns. The policy-makers may have realised that a 
new economic strategy could be the inevitable complement of its har-
monious society. Calls for an alternative reserve currency are likely to be 
more symbolic than real in the near future, but the new interdependence 
has been clearly demonstrated by the United States’ efforts to reassure 
Chinese partners of the safety of their deposits, and by China selling its 
US-based (and dollar-based) assets. The crisis did not cause this interde-
pendence – the pattern of globalisation starting in 1978 did that – but 
the crisis has made this interdependence remarkably clear, and has 
helped to fuel nationalism in China. 
Internally, after the crisis there was discussion about a watershed in 
China’s development model. There were concerns that the export-led 
model of growth would no longer be sustainable (Song 2009), not only 
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because levels of demand would not return to their previous levels, but 
also because of shifting of production of export commodities. Beijing 
Normal University professor Zhang Xiulan argued in 2009 that the “cur-
rent financial crisis has greatly accelerated the development of a compre-
hensive system of social protection in China”. As we have seen, such 
shifts are likely to be gradual, and subject to contestation. Groups of 
elites within the Party might capitalise on existing dissatisfaction (Pei 
2009): The crisis may be sharpening the differences between the Populist 
Coalition led by Hu and Wen with its emphasis on balanced develop-
ment, and the Elitist Coalition with its focus on economic efficiency and 
coastal development (Li Cheng 2009).  
Further, crises are moments when the role of social policy as com-
plement to economic policy (rather than being residual) come to the 
fore, both to stabilise the economy and to address rising unemployment 
and citizens’ disaffection. In South Korea, there was a strong belief that 
economic policy was the best social policy, and this was proven wrong 
during the 1997-1998 crisis, even though the notion of the welfare state 
as an instrument for economic development prevails. While South  
Korea’s welfare state was undergoing a longer term transformation, the 
crisis triggered a range of responses, including increasing social spending. 
The crisis and the surprise victory of the centre-left opposition in the 
presidential election cemented a new social consensus for economic 
reform alongside strengthening the welfare state. The crisis prompted 
new inclusive policy institutions such as a tripartite committee to pro-
mote the reform, integrated national health insurance cooperation, and a 
notion of social rights under-building the welfare state (Kwon 2009). 
In the case of China, the crisis response builds directly on earlier ef-
forts for a “harmonious society”, and less stringent fiscal and monetary 
policies will not only support domestic household consumption, but will 
also allow for increased investment in the public services for which the 
foundation had been created before the crisis. It is important to highlight 
that the Chinese crisis response was formulated entirely internally, with 
none of the pressure that Thailand and Indonesia faced (though China 
did have intensified debates with its partner in the G-2, the US). The 
crisis response demonstrated the Chinese government’s ability to formu-
late strong responses to new development challenges, with social policy 
playing a growing role in the broader national politics. There are no signs 
of political transitions like those witnessed in Asia after the 1997 crisis, 
and the Chinese leadership has used the crisis as an opportunity to re-
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assert legitimacy (as it did after the Wenchuan earthquake), for example 
by reassuring the population that China would be able the weather the 
crisis.  
Conclusion: Crisis as an Opportunity 
A key lesson from crises seems to be that they tend to, or have the po-
tential to, galvanise the forces for better social policies, and to galvanise a 
social consensus for more inclusive policies. Of course, in Europe the 
Great Depression galvanised something different: the rise of fascism and 
World War II (and indeed it probably was the war that ended the reces-
sion in the US rather than the stimulus of the New Deal). The crisis of 
2008-2009, at present, looks to have been managed much better than 
that of the 1930s, through national rescue and stimulus packages, and an 
emphasis on continued international economic cooperation.  
This crisis presented China with two main opportunities, but both 
with nagging drawbacks. First, the crisis led China to assert itself into 
global economic and financial fora, and to show that renewed confi-
dence internally, though its economic future is by design tightly linked to 
that of the US. Second, the crisis presents China with the opportunity to 
adjust its export-led model of development with associated costs of ris-
ing inequalities and environmental costs toward a more inward-oriented 
and equitable development model, building on the efforts over the last 
decade to create a “harmonious society” and to rebalance the productiv-
ism of its public policies since the 1978 reforms. However, this transition 
will be a slow one, because of a path-dependency of focus on infrastruc-
ture, because of vested interests of the export industry, and given the 
aversion to welfarist spending. Moreover, China’s proven model of a 
gradualist approach makes it unlikely that drastic policy changes will be 
attempted.  
China is currently engaged in a dramatic transformation, with large-
scale privatisation and rapid industrialisation managed under one-party 
control. The crisis in itself is not changing China’s development model, 
but is providing the opportunities for a more equitable model. The next 
years will show whether China will be able to implement the necessary 
social policy instruments, under relatively favourable fiscal conditions, 
and a nascent social policy system which may be able to absorb the kind 
of new funding that is required, with the potential to enhance equality or 
at least halt the rapid rise in inequality of the last two decades, and with 
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the possibility that this brings drastic changes to the current systems of 
regressive fiscal transfers. The way China chooses to respond on its pub-
lic policies will not only have an enormous impact on hundreds of mil-
lions of its citizens, (particularly those that have recently escaped from 
poverty and those still suffering from chronic poverty), but will also have 
an impact on the global economy, and will be cited as an example for the 
Global South’s potential to manage the fluctuations of the global econ-
omy.  
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